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is all that it is! If the traditional test of legitimacy, birth in lawful
wedlock, has been watered down to its present state, then it might
profitably be forgotten altogether.
The only conscionable excuse for maintaining the present anoma-
lous situation is that the stigma of bastardy is some form of deterrent
to the prospective father. The fallacy of this is readily apparent - it
is very unlikely that any such thought would enter his mind at the only
time that the deterrent could be operative. It might also be defended
from the standpoint of any legitimate children of the testator. But it is
illogical that such children should be allowed the benefit of a state of
affairs with which they had absolutely nothing to do. The time is
therefore ripe to complete the spring-cleaning of the law on this
matter with appropriate legislation.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Simpson Land Co. Ltd. v. Black Contractors Ltd.
BRUCE I. MACTAGGART '
NAVIGABLE WATERS - PRIVATE AND PUBLIC RIGHTS IN MAN-MADE
INLETS.
This decision provides an analysis of the definition of "navigable
water". The facts are as follows: The Crown patent for the lot involved
reserved to the Crown the right to enjoy any navigable water which
might be found on, or flowing through, the lot in question. The issue
raised was whether the owner, after removing sand from his lot in
such a manner as to create a bay, could assert private rights over the
waters in such bay so as to prevent others from sailing across it.
The Supreme Court of Canada, affirming the trial judge and the
Ontario Court of Appeal, held that the owner of the lot could not
prevent anyone from sailing across the bay, the waters being properly
characterized as "navigable," even though he owned the land now
forming the bottom of the bay.
In detail the facts are as follows: The defendants, while in the
course of removing sand from Lot 3 of Grenadier Island, of which
they eventually became the owners, caused a bay to be formed in this
lot about 600 feet in horizontal depth and 545 feet in width at its
mouth. The defendants likewise conducted similar operations on the
adjacent lot, Lot 4, creating another bay which opened into the bay
created in Lot 3. When the defendants' lease to remove sand from Lot
4 terminated, the plaintiff took up the lease to carry on similar sand
removing operations. The plaintiff asked permission from the defen-
*Mr. MacTaggart is a second year student at Osgoode Hall Law School.
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dants to cross the bay created in Lot 3 to gain access to Lot 4. The
defendants refused. The plaintiff attempted to find another entrance
into the bay on Lot 4, but found no other possibility that was economi-
cally feasible. The plaintiff, despite the defendants' refusal, commenced
sailing across the bay of Lot 3, into the bay of Lot 4 with their sand
removing equipment. To prevent this, the defendants put obstructions
in the bay of Lot 3, preventing the plaintiff from navigating across the
bay. The plaintiff sued for an injunction for the removal of the obstruc-
tions. The injunction was granted by the Court.
In reaching its conclusions the Supreme Court followed the case
of Cram v. Ryan' and distinguished the case of Sim E. Bak et al. v.
Ang Yong Huat.2
The facts in Cram v. Ryan are similar to Simpson Sand Co. v.
Black Douglas Contractors Ltd.3 In Cram v. Ryan the defendants had
a licence to remove sand from lands situated along the St. Mary's
River, and in doing so created a bay in which the plaintiff moored
his boarding scow. The defendants proceeded to operate their sand
removing equipment and while doing so ejected sparks which ignited
and destroyed the plaintiff's scow. It was held that the plaintiff's
scow, while in the bay created by the defendants, was not a trespasser
since it was moored in public navigable waters and not private waters.
In the case of public navigable waters there is a right of access to the
shore. Armour, C.J. stated that when the shore line was moved back
from its natural position, the water so let in was as much publici
juris as an other part of the water of the river, and the removal of
the shore line back from the natural line did not take away the free
access to the shore as newly established. 4
Perhaps one important similarity between Cram v. Ryan and
.Simpson Sand Co. v. Black Douglas Contractors Ltd. was that the
,deeds of the lands from which the sand was removed had identical
reservations to the Crown. The Crown had the right to enjoy any
navigable waters which may be found on, or under, or flowing through,
,or upon the lands granted.5
The case upon which the appeal to the Supreme Court was based,
-and which the Court chose to distinguish, was Sim E. Bak v. Ang
Yong Huat. The waters in question there were the waters of the
Kalang River of India, a tidal river which was described by Lord
Wrenbury as more like a mango swamp than a public navigable
1 (1894), 24 O.R. 500; Aff'd 25 O.R. 524.
2 [1923] A.C. 429.
3 [1964] S.C.R. 333.
4 Supra, footnote 1, 25 O.R. at 528.
5 The deeds contained reservations similar to the following:(a) reserving free access to the shore of the lands hereby granted for
all vessels, boats and persons.(b) reserving, nevertheless unto us, our heirs and successors, the free
uses, pasage, and enjoyment of, in, over, and upon all navigable
waters that shall or may hereafter be found on or under, or be
flowing through, or upon, any part of the said parcel or tract of
land hereby granted as aforesaid.
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river.6 In Sim E. Bak both the plaintiff and defendant owned lands
in which holes had been dug for the purpose of removing brick clay.
A bridge had been constructed about thirty years before via which
water could be admitted onto the lands to fill these holes, thus creating
many small ponds and lagoons. The defendant cut through the bank
of the river so that tidal water could obtain access to a pond on his
land, his purpose being to allow fish to come up with the tide, flow
into the pond and there be intercepted by a sluice which he had
erected. To prevent the fish from reaching the defendant's land the
plaintiff erected a fence on his property extending across the mouth
of the defendant's sluice. As a result the fish did not reach the defen-
dant's pond. The defendant tore down the fence, but in the ensuing
action the plaintiff successfully asserted his right to build this fence
on his land.
The Privy Council held that the waters in question were not navi-
gable despite the fact that boats within limited size could and did
pass through the bridge and up the waterway to bring brick clay out
from the lands, and despite the fact that tidal waters did reach the
land. The court indicated that the flowing of the tide is strong prima
facie evidence of the existence of a public navigable right, but whether
there was such a right depended upon the situation and the nature
of the channel. Not every ditch or catchment which is reached by the
tide forms part of navigable waters, even though they be sufficient to
admit the passage of a boat. The question is one of fact for the jury
to decide in light of all the circumstances.7 Because the waters were
characterized as non-navigable, the defendant could not object to
any erection of a fence made by the plaintiff on his own land, notwith-
standing that the lands were from time to time covered by tidal waters.
The Supreme Court in Simpson distinguished Sim E. Bak on the
basis that there the plaintiff created the channels for a specific pur-
pose,8 i.e., for the purpose of creating a fish catchment, whereas in both
Cram v. Ryan and in Simpson Land Co. v. Black Contractors the
water was on the land only as the incidental result of a sand removal
operation. The Court felt that the letting of water on to one's land
artificially for a specific purpose was quite distinguishable from the
mere broadening of the St. Mary's or St. Lawrence Rivers by a sand
removal operation on the banks.9
It is significant to note that the Supreme Court played down the
factor of commercial utilityl0 in the test for navigability, although
paying it lip service.n
6 Supra, footnote 2 at 432.
7 Id. at 433.
8 Supra, footnote 3 at 337.
9 The St. Lawrence and the Great Lake chain are recognized as navigable
waters (Dixon v. Snetsinger (1873), 23 U.C.C.P. 235).
10 A.G. Que. v. Fraser (1906), 37 S.C.R. 577; Keewatin Power Co. v. Town
of Kenora (1907), 13 O.L.R. 237; Rotte v. Booth (1886), 11 O.R. 491; Gordon
v. HaUl, 16 D.L.R. (2d) 379.
11 Supra, footnote 3 at 440.
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It is worth while to consider the past history of the test of
navigability and its connection with ownership of the solum below such
waters. At common law the test for navigability originally was based
on the ebb and flow of the tide. The beds of all such navigable waters
were vested prima facie in the Crown for the benefit of the subject.
The beds of all other rivers vested in the riparian owners ad medium
filum aquae, and this right included fishing rights.
In Canada, the tidal/non-tidal test for navigable waters and hence
ownership of the solum was not imported into our law because of its
inappropriateness to our situation.12 The test of navigability, which
in turn determined ownership of the solum, became a question of fact.13
Thus only where the waters are characterized as non-navigable, does
the concept of riparian ownership come into play. The tidal distinction
is now only applicable to fishing rights. In tidal waters, there is a
public right to fish, but not in non-tidal waters.14
Where the Crown grants a water-lot to a subject, but retains a
reservation in respect of any navigable waters, the express grant
severs the ownership of the solum from the rights of public navigation.
The public right of navigation is much like an easement and the
grantee of the solum takes subject to such right. The grantee cannot
interfere with or obstruct the public right of navigation which is para-
mount to all other rights in the water.' 5
What are the factors that point towards navigability? The flowing
of tidal waters is a prima facie but not conclusive test.'6 User for
commercial purposes is a factor that has been often considered.17 With
this decision, the Supreme Court has created a still further test. If
the waters are let onto land for a specific private purpose from a source
that itself qualifies as navigable, they are not characterized as navi-
gable; but if the waters flow onto land as the indirect result of a dredg-
ing operation which has the effect of merely indenting the shoreline
of recognized navigable waters, they will be characterized as navi-
gable.' 8
It is submitted that such a test could produce problems. What if a
person creates a bay such as the one in question for use as a private
harbour? Should the fleeting element of a man's intention determine
the character of the waters? The difficulty lies in distinguishing fact
situations in the twilight zones. It is submitted that a subjective test,
such as that here adopted by the Court, is inappropriate and should
be avoided.
12 Clarke v. Edmonton [1930] S.C.R. 137; Dixon v. Snetsinger (1873) 23
U.C.C.P. 235; now codified in The Beds of Navigable Waters Act, R.S.O. 1960,
c. 32.
13 A.G. Que. v. Fraser (1906), 37 S.C.R. 577; R. v. Meyers (1853), 3 U.C.C.P.
305 (the Canadian common law and civil law positions now being the same).
14 A.G. Can. v. A.G. Que. (1921] A.C. (civil law).
A.G. B.C. v. A.G. Can. [1914] A.C. 153 (common law).
15 Cunard v. P.. (1910), 43 S.C.R. 88.
16 Supra, footnote 2 at 443.
17 Supra, footnote 10.
18 Supra, footnote 9.
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